Budget de…cit has been a common …scal pressure facing Chinese cities since the 1994 …scal reform. Meanwhile, land lease sales have become a signi…cant o¤-budgetary revenue to local governments since 2003. This paper investigates whether …nancing budget de…cit is an important driving force of the recent soaring housing prices when local governments function as the monopoly supplier of urban land. A conceptual framework is developed to illustrate a transmission mechanism from budget de…cit to housing prices. This leads to an empirical model consisting of two simultaneous structural equations for housing prices and land prices. Using data for the 35 major Chinese cities from 2003 to 2011, an empirical exercise shows although budget de…cit has a positive e¤ect on land prices, it is the factors from demand side, such as amenities, income and the user cost of housing capital, that have been pulling up the housing prices.
Introduction
In the past decade major Chinese cities have been experiencing a surge of housing prices that is probably unprecedented in history. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the average real residential housing prices in the 35 major Chinese cities have steadily increased from 2426 yuan per square meter in 2003 to 5937 yuan per square meter in 2011. 1 This implies an 11.8% real compound annual growth rate, which even dwarfs China's remarkable GDP growth rate during the same period. Such rampant housing price growth has aroused great interest and concern on its causes and consequences.
Among many alternative explanations, a public …nance perspective has been attracting more and more attention among media, researchers and policy makers. Although di¤erent people may frame their hypotheses in various ways, a common feature of this perspective is to attribute the soaring housing prices to the high reliance of local is becoming an important o¤-budgetary revenue to local governments. According to Figure 3 , averaging across cities the land transferring fee reaches 57% of the revenue and in some years this ratio even exceeds 70%. It is not surprising that a new terminology "land …nance" has been created and frequently appears in the title of news reports, research papers and policy discussion.
Although the conjecture that links housing prices to budget de…cit has been popular for a while, this is probably the …rst paper that formally tests whether the local governments' budget de…cit is indeed a driving force of the recent soaring housing prices. The answer to this question is important for at least two reasons. First, it has immediate policy implications. The accumulation of local budget de…cit and in ‡ation of housing prices are two urgent challenges facing policy makers in China. If local budget de…cit indeed has a causal e¤ect on housing price growth, a reform in public …nance might be more pertinent than price regulations in curbing housing price in‡ation. 2 On the other hand, if housing price appreciation has a causal e¤ect on land 1 These 35 cities represent all municipalities, provincial capital cities and quasi-provincial capital cities in China, whose housing prices have been closely watched. 2 The State Council, China's top policy-making body, has implemented a series of housing price price appreciation, given the signi…cant role of land transferring fee in making up for the local budget de…cit, a large enough drop in housing prices could potentially lead to a local …scal crisis. Second, the answer to this research question also has general theoretical values. What to spend and how a government …nances its expenditure are the central themes of public …nance. In most advanced economies, local governments spend money in providing local public services, which enhance the local public amenities and are capitalized into housing prices. Such expenditure is …nanced from property tax, which increases with housing values. Local governments in China are also the provider of local public services but have to …nance the expenditure from land lease sales instead of property tax. This unique feature o¤ers an interesting case to study the role of public …nance on resource allocation and asset price. Inspired by these existing researches, this paper provides a conceptual framework for the transmission mechanism from budget de…cit to housing prices, by explicitly modeling the interrelationship between housing prices and land prices. This leads to a system with two simultaneous structural equations for housing prices and land prices.
A panel data set of the 35 cities that is publicly available from 2003 to 2011 is employed to estimate the model. Under a set of alternative endogeneity assumptions, a robust …nding is the importance of the demand side factors on pulling up the housing prices.
Although budget de…cit does have a positive e¤ect on land prices, land prices have limited contribution to the surging housing prices. In contrast, housing prices are the most important determinant for land prices. This implies that the increase in housing prices has been the cause rather than the consequence of the increasing land prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 …rst introduces the institutional background that is necessary to appreciate the logic behind the hypothesis.
Section 3 describes the theoretical framework. Section 4 explains the data and reports the empirical …ndings. Section 5 discusses the implications and limitations. 2 Institutional Background
The Housing Market and Land Market
The housing market reform in China was far lagged behind its general economic reform. Before 1998, most employees lived in housing provided by their work units with a highly subsidized rent. In 1998 the State Council formally abolished this welfare-based public housing system by decree. From then on, employees get housing bene…ts in cash from their employers and have to buy or rent residential housing in the private market. The return of the desire for homeownership after decades of suppression during the socialist era leads to a signi…cant increase in housing prices (Wang, 2011) .
The development of land market in China was further lagged behind its housing market. By law, the state has the ultimate ownership of all land. Any individual or organization has to apply for permission from the government in construction on any land. In practice, the local governments function as the monopoly supplier of urban land. In a typical case of development, a local government …rst converts a parcel of agriculture land at the suburban periphery into urban land by compensating farmers who work and live on it. The local government then sells the land use right to a developer in exchange for a land transferring fee. The developer builds private housing units on the parcel and subsequently sell the units to individual households.
Households have the right to live in, rent out and resell their housing during the leasehold period, which is 70 years for residential housing.
Before 2003, the land use right was usually not publicly transacted. Instead, when a developer was interested in a particular land parcel, it would approach the government and negotiate a price for it. This process has been criticized for being subject to possible bribe and corruption and results in a land price below market value. In April 
The Fiscal Reforms and Budget De…cit
The total revenue of Chinese local governments is made of three components: bud- The increasing gap between expenditure and revenue rendered local governments to enthusiastically pursue various extra-budgetary funds, which they generally got to As a compensation to local governments for the losses from a series of …scal reforms, massive land conversion and development throughout the country was tacitly considered as a legitimate source for "topping up" local public expenditures (Cai, Henderson and Zhang, 2012; Jia, Guo and Zhang, 2014). Consequently, many local governments began to keenly engage in promoting urbanization (Kung, Xu and Zhou, 2011) . Rapid urbanization helps spur local GDP growth, which in turn enhances the career prospects of local o¢ cials (Xu, 2011) .
As highlighted in Column 6, revenue from land transferring fee is becoming a more and more important source of o¤-budgetary local revenue. There is indeed a sudden jump in the ratio of land transferring fee to local budgetary revenue in 2003, when all land leaseholds must be transacted via public auctions. Column 7 reports the provincial Gini coe¢ cient of this ratio. The obvious decrease in the Gini coe¢ cient suggests that more and more local governments exercise their monopoly power in land supply and grasp huge windfall via land sales.
Budget De…cit and Housing Prices: A Framework
Taking into account the interesting China speci…c background, this section derives a conceptual framework in which housing prices and land prices are simultaneously determined through the interaction of households, developers and local governments in the two related markets. Speci…cally, in housing market, the equilibrium housing price level is determined by housing demand and housing supply derived from the behavior of households and developers, respectively. In land market, the demand from developers and the monopoly supply from local government yield the equilibrium land price level. The model consisting of housing price and land price equations serves as a theoretical guider for the empirical exercises in Section 4.
This model shares three common features with the literature. First, as predicted by the monocentric city model such as Mills (1967) , this model also implies an increase in income and population will lead to an increase in the land and housing prices of the city. Second, it follows the asset approach such as Poterba (1984) and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) , in deriving the equilibrium condition for households'tenure choice. Finally, it examines the role of local governments on the values of housing and land from a public …nance perspective pioneered by Tiebout (1956) and Oats (1969).
Households
The preferences of a representative household living in a city are captured by the utility function U = U (a; g; ; x). Here a is the exogenous amenities of a city, such as clean air. g represents local public amenities that enhance the quality of life. is the units of housing space that the household has rent. x stands for a bundle of private goods whose price is normalized to unity. Suppose the rent is r per unit. This implies each household consumes housing service, either as a tenant renting from landlords, or as a home owner e¤ectively renting to itself. Denote the disposable income of the household as y. Utility maximization subject to the income budget constraint r + x = y leads to an optimal demand for rent given by function = (r; a; g; y). For a city with N homogeneous households, the aggregate demand function for rent is therefore
where 
where
> 0, and
The user cost is de…ned as + + +i Q . Here stands for depreciation rate, for maintenance cost, for risk premium of housing capital relative to safe assets, i for nominal interest rate, for overall in ‡ation rate, and Q for real housing price in ‡ation rate. 3 To accommodate the status competition hypothesis of Wei, Zhang and Liu (2010), an ownership premium, similar to risk premium but working in the opposite direction, is allowed in the user cost. It implies that the rise in housing prices is not driven by an actual demand for housing, but by the demand for owning a house itself. This ownership premium is measured by the sex ratio s, as a proxy for the intensity of status competition. This leads to an augmented user cost of housing capital under China's context as
Developers
Property developers are simultaneously on the supply side of housing market and demand side of land market. Under the assumption of free entry they are price takers in both markets. Suppose developers use the production technology
The pro…t function is therefore given by pF (L) L (l + c) c 0 , where l is the unit land price that the developers have bid to obtain the land and c is a unit composite cost of construction. c 0 is a …xed cost for zero pro…t condition. The …rst order condition of pro…t maximization then leads to the demand function for land
It also implies that the supply function of housing is given by
Local Government
The institutional background introduced in Section 2.1 implies that the local government is the monopoly supplier of urban land. As described in Section 2.2, to meet the large and increasing gap between expenditure and revenue, the local government 3 In Poterba's (1984 Poterba's ( , 1991 original work in the context of the U.S., the user cost is determined by
where stands for marginal income tax rate, for property tax rate. Given there is no general property tax and mortgage interest is not tax deductible in China, we assume = = 0 here. supplies L s units of urban land so as to balance the de…cit d with the net revenue from land leasing:
is the cost of land supply. Suppose farmers are fairly compensated when the local government levies agriculture land and converts it into urban land for property development. 4 Then the cost of supplying urban land is determined by the revenue of agriculture land, which depends on A, the agriculture productivity, and L 0 L s , the di¤erence between total available land for either agriculture production or residence, and urban land supply. Equation (6) gives the land supply as a function of budget de…cit:
Equilibrium Housing and Land Prices
When the housing market is at equilibrium,
An equilibrium housing price level p can be derived by equating equation (3) with (5):
Equating equation (4) with (7) leads to the equilibrium land price level: < 0. Since an increase in budget de…cit may lead to an increase in land sales or an increase in land price, the sign of @l @d is ambiguous. It depends on the price elasticity of land demand, which is fundamentally determined by the construction technology F ; and the marginal cost of urban land supply, which is in e¤ect regulated by the function form of the agriculture revenue. 5 The system of two simultaneous equations (8) and (9) characterizes a possible transmission mechanism from budget de…cit d to housing price p. Although land price l has an unambiguous positive e¤ect on housing price p, the model predicts an ambiguous e¤ect of budget de…cit d on land price l, which leaves the e¤ect of budget de…cit d on housing price p an empirical question. 4 According to some anecdote news, local governments could underestimate the land acquisition compensation for farmers to boost revenue. However, since the compensation data is not available, it is not possible to test this potential mechanism. That is why we maintain the fair compensation assumption in the model. 5 Equations (8) and (9) The model has been explicit about the endogenous relationship between p and l in the two related markets and treats all other variables as exogenous. If households have perfect mobility as assumed in Tiebout (1956) , when they shop among di¤erent cities and select as residents of the city which o¤ers the housing price-and-public service package best suited to their preferences, both local public amenity g and budget de…cit d would be endogenous. In a more general setting with an open system of cities, such as Albouy (2009), both income level y and population size N would also be endogenous.
For simplicity, the theoretical framework is restricted only to the case of exogeneity.
But the empirical section does test the importance of allowing for potential endogeneity of g, d, y and N . We assume that equations (8) and (9) are linear and stochastic. They can be represented by the following model for estimation: (10) and
Empirical Exercises
where u (10) . Since these two structural equations are derived from behavioral models, their coe¢ cients have causal interpretation. For example, though p it and l it are interdependent, 1 in equation (10) measures the causal e¤ect of land price on housing price. Similarly, 2 in equation (11) gives the causal e¤ect of budget de…cit on land price. In addition, these two structural equations also indicate that budget de…cit has no direct e¤ect on housing price, but it a¤ects housing price via land price. To address the potential concern of the endogeneity of budget de…cit, a lagged value of budget de…cit, d i;t 1 , is included in the land price equation (11) .
By substituting equation (11) into (10), these two structural equations give a reduced-form equation for housing price:
where u i and v it are the unobservable city speci…c e¤ects and the error term, respectively. The coe¢ cients in this reduced-form regression measure the overall e¤ects of the corresponding variables on housing price. For example, 4 is the total e¤ect of income on housing prices. In the reduced-form equation, no mechanism is speci…ed how income a¤ects housing price, so 4 has di¤erent interpretation from the structural parameter 4 in equation (10) . Note that 1 measures the indirect e¤ect of budget de…cit on housing price. The omitted land price serves as a transmission channel, which is a¤ected by budget de…cit and contributes to housing price dynamics.
Data and Variables
Data on housing price p come from the China Real Estate Statistic Book, which reports the city average residential housing prices every year since 1998 but only for the 35 major cities. Data on land price l are from the China Land and Resource Almanac, calculated as dividing the land transferring fee by land transferring area transacted via auctions. 6 Ideally, both housing prices and land prices should be constructed to adjust for quality change, using either the repeated sales price indexes pioneered by Case and Shiller (1987) , or more pertinently, the hedonic techniques for a nascent market like China as suggested by Wu, Deng and Liu (2013). Using city average housing and land prices certainly smooths out many within-city heterogeneities in the quality of housing units and land parcels. However, such construction needs information from micro-level data which are not publicly available even for these major Chinese cities and for very recent years.
The amenity of a city a potentially has many measures, such as climate and geography. However, both of them are time-invariant. To identify the e¤ect of amenity on housing price in a …xed-e¤ects model, following Zheng, Kahn and Liu (2010) this paper adopts a time-varying measure of quality of air, namely the SO 2 density reported in the City Statistic Yearbook. Local public expenditure is usually taken as the only feasible proxy for public output that determines the local public amenities g. Per capita government expenditure immediately suggested itself; however, it is not a satisfactory measure, given some variations in spending may have nothing to do with the level or quality of output. Following the literature in urban economics, such as Oates (1966) , g is measured by government expenditure on education per student. Both the numerator and denominator come from the China Statistic Yearbook for Regional Economy.
y is proxied by urban disposable income per capita reported in the China Statistic Yearbook for Regional Economy. N is measured by total population, which is collected from the statistic yearbooks for each province and municipality. Total population is the sum of local residents with hukou and migrants without hukou but live in the city for more than six months of the year. Large scale rural-to-urban migration has been taking place in China as a result of massive industrialization and urbanization, while these major cities are the main destination of the migrants. These new migrants contribute to the housing demand, either directly through purchase or indirectly through renting.
As for the components of user cost, the data on male-to-female sex ratio s are from the Statistics of City and County Demographic. The 5-year nominal interest rate of deposit serves as a good measure for i. It is common across all the cities but is very volatile over the sample period. As usual, the growth rate of CPI is taken as a measure for the overall in ‡ation rate .
The key challenge lies in the measurement for Q , the expected real housing price appreciation, since households'expectation is not observable. Both the classical survey for the U.S. (Case and Shiller, 1988 ) and the empirical evidence for China (Kuang, 2010) suggest that most households seem to set price expectation with a backwardlooking process. Therefore, this paper measures Q by the growth rate of real housing prices in the previous year in the benchmark speci…cation. The empirical exercise also allows for a more ‡exible treatment for expectation using a dynamic panel data It is not feasible to directly measure the total available land L 0 that is suitable for either agriculture production or residence without detailed geographic information such as in Saiz (2010) . However, by de…nition, the administration area of a city is made of three parts: …rst, area that is not suitable for agriculture production or residence due to physical restriction; second, area that is already urban area or has been ready for urban development, which is known as constructed area; and …nally, the unconstructed area that can potentially be converted from agriculture land to urban land. Since the …rst part is almost a constant, the third part, i.e., the total available land L 0 , must be an increasing function of the di¤erence between administration area and constructed area. City Statistics Yearbook reports information for both areas. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for all the variables discussed as above.
Those variables in levels have been converted into 2003 constant yuan using city speci…c CPI. Log operation is applied to p, l, a, g, y, N , c, A and L 0 in the regressions so that the corresponding coe¢ cients have an elasticity interpretation.
Results
This section reports estimation results of the two structural equations for housing price (10) and land price (11) , and the reduced-form housing price equation (12).
7 Table 3 presents estimation results of land price structural equation (11) . Since housing price (p) and land price (l) are simultaneously determined in equations (10) and (11), they are endogenous. Inconsistent …xed-e¤ects results are included in Column 1 for comparison. To deal with the endogeneity issue, instruments for (p) are used after within transformation. Column 2 (FEIV1) reports …xed-e¤ects IV estimation using instruments (a, g, y, N , s, i) (clean air, government education expenditure per student, disposable income per capita, total population, sex ratio and interest rate, respectively), which are exogenous in the housing price structural equation. The coe¢ cient of budget de…cit (d) suggests that on average one percentage increase in local governments'budget de…cit leads to a 12:6% increase in land price. This implies that holding other factors constant, if the budget de…cit-to-GDP ratio of a city is one standard deviation higher than the average, its land price would be 29% higher than the average. The estimated housing price elasticity shows that 1% increase in housing price pulls up land price by 0:883%. This large elasticity indicates that the increasing land price is mainly translated from the surge of housing prices. The …rst-stage F statistic is 52:25, suggesting that the instruments used are statistically valid, 7 Panel unit root tests have been conducted for both (p) and (l). Based on Levin-Lin-Chu and Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root tests, no evidence supports that l follows a unit root process. For housing price p, the testing results are con ‡icting. Levin-Lin-Chu test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root process, while Im-Pesaran-Shin test fails to reject the null. Since it is well known that housing price around the world do not follow a random walk (Case and Shiller, 1989 ) because of the downward stickiness, and the data set used here is a short panel with identi…cation mainly from cross-city variation, the nonstationarity issue is less concerned. as predicted by equation (8) of the theoretical model. Using lagged housing prices (p i;t 1 ) as an instrument for p it , …xed-e¤ects IV regression (Column 3, FEIV2) gives a similar estimate of the e¤ect of budget de…cit on land price, while the housing price elasticity drops to 0:782.
Column 4 considers the case that d i;t 1 is allowed to be endogenous. Agriculture GDP as a share of total GDP (AR i;t 1 ) is explored as an external instrument for d i;t 1 . Together with the instruments (a, g, y, N , s, i) for p it , in this …xed-e¤ects IV regression, the estimated e¤ect of budget de…cit on land prices increases to 16:5%, and the housing price elasticity is nearly unchanged.
When year e¤ects are included in Columns 5-8 of Table 3 , the budget de…cit coef…cient slightly drops to 9:4%-11%, but remains signi…cant in most cases. The housing price elasticity decreases to 0:280-0:405 and becomes statistically insigni…cant. 8 The estimation results of housing price structural equation (10) are reported in Table 4 .
9 Column 1 presents …xed-e¤ects estimates. Due to simultaneous causality, l it is endogenous in housing price structural equation. l it is instrumented by the excluded exogenous variables (d i;t 1 , A it , L 0;it ) (budget de…cit-to-GDP ratio, agriculture GDP per rural capita and total available land, respectively) in land price structural equation (11), and the corresponding …xed-e¤ects IV estimates are reported in Column 2. Using a lagged value (l i;t 1 ) as an instrument for l it , …xed-e¤ects IV in Column 3 gives a much bigger, but statistically insigni…cant, estimate of land price elasticity, 0:218. No strong evidence is found to explain the increasing housing prices by land 8 All instruments are statistically signi…cant in …rst-stage regressions of …xed-e¤ects IV regression in Columns 3-4, 6-8. 9 As suggested by Arellano (2003, p.61), since interest rate i t is a perfect linear combination of year dummies, year e¤ects are not employed for housing price equations. 10 The coe¢ cient of d i;t 1 is 0:102 and its t ratio is 2:73 in the …rst-stage regression. 11 In Columns 1-3, Q it is measured by the growth rate of (log) real housing price in the previous year, i.e., Q it = p i;t 1 p i;t 2 . Since housing price data for the 35 major cities dated back to 1998, we also experiment by calculating Instead of using past housing price growth as a direct measure, adaptive expectation may also be modelled by including lagged housing price levels in the housing price structural equation (10) . This turns (10) into a dynamic panel data model. 12 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates are reported. In addition to p i;t 1 and p i;t 2 , l, (l; g), and (l; g; y; N ) are treated as endogenous variables in GMM1, GMM2 and GMM3, respectively. In each model, other regressors are treated either as exogenous or predetermined. Across these 6 GMM estimation settings, land price elasticity ranges from 0:023 to 0:114, supporting the …nding of small e¤ect of land price on housing price in the …xed-e¤ects regressions (Columns 1-3 ). Together with a small and statistically insigni…cant estimate of the construction cost (c), the regression results seem to indicate that supply side factors do not play a major role in determining the housing price, at least in this sample. In addition, the importance of clear air (a), local public goods (g) and disposable income (y) is further con…rmed here, but with smaller coe¢ cients.
Not surprisingly, as a measure of adaptive expectation, the coe¢ cient for the …rst lag of the housing price (p i;t 1 ) turns to be large and signi…cant. This also indicates the important e¤ect of past housing price on current housing price. However, GMM estimates of population (N ) turn out insigni…cant with a much smaller magnitude, ranging from 0:047 to 0:224. A robustness check is implemented in Section 4.3 to investigate whether this is due to measurement errors in population. 13 As one important component of the user cost, the e¤ect of interest rate (i) on housing price is pronounced: one percentage increase in interest rate leads to a 4% to 5% decrease in housing price in all speci…cations except Column 3. In addition, consistent with Wei, Zhang and Liu (2012), we …nd robust e¤ect of sex ratio on housing price. One percentage of sex ratio raises housing price by 3% to 4%.
Finally, to examine the overall e¤ect of budget de…cit on housing price, reducedform regression results for equation (12) are reported in Table 5 . Column 1 reports the …xed-e¤ects estimates, in which adaptive expectation Q it = p i;t 1 p i;t 2 is treated 12 The model becomes:
13 Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimates with t statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in Table 4 . The two-step estimates yield similar coe¢ cients. However, since the two-step GMM standard errors are downward biased, and the Windmeijer-corrected standard errors seem unreasonably big in this sample, two-step results are not included. The p-values of Sargan test in Table 4 are based on one-step GMM standard errors. The p-values of Arellano-Bond's m1, m2 tests based on robust standard errors are also reported. This is also the case in Tables 5 and 6. as exogenous. Similarly, this expectation can be modelled by a dynamic panel data model. 14 Arellano-Bond GMM estimates with 2 lags are reported in GMM1. In GMM2 and GMM3, (g) and (g; y; N ) are treated as endogenous variables, respectively.
As in Table 4 , in each model, other regressors are treated as either exogenous or predetermined. In all 7 sets of estimates, de…cit-to-GDP ratio is insigni…cant and its coe¢ cients are nearly 0, suggesting that the indirect e¤ect of de…cit-to-GDP ratio on housing price is negligible. No evidence is found that …nancing budget de…cit by local governments is an important driving force of the recent soaring housing prices. 15 This is consistent with the …ndings from the estimates of the two structural equations.
Though high de…cit-to-GDP ratio raises land price by a semi-elasticity from 9% to 17%, land price contributes a small slice to housing price. Except the additional regressors (d, A, L 0 ) and construction cost (c), the reducedform regression in Table 5 delivers similar message as the housing price structural equation results in Table 4 . The four components of the user cost of housing capital, sex ratio (s), interest rate (i) and CPI growth rate ( ) and expected increase in housing price ( Q ) all have the expected signs and most of them have signi…cant e¤ects across all alternative speci…cations. This implies that the growth of housing prices is mainly driven by the demand side factors, namely, change in amenities, income and the user cost of housing capital.
Robustness Checks
This section conducts three robustness checks. Table 6 summarizes the corresponding empirical …ndings by reporting the reduced-form housing price regressions. 16 Each empirical exercise includes a …xed-e¤ects regression where expectation is proxied by Q it , and a GMM regression with 2 lags. The …rst robustness check excludes the 4 super cities (Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Shenzhen) from the sample. Since each of these cities has a population size over 10 million, a potential concern is that the land and housing markets in these cities 14 The model becomes:
15 As pointed out by one referee, the impact of …scal situation could last longer. To take this possibility into account, one-year lagged value d t 1 is replaced with the average of three-year lagged values in regressions (11) and (12) . In the housing price reduced-form regression, the magnitude of coe¢ cients changes slightly. Same as in Table 5 , budget de…cit has little impact on housing price. This is also the case in the land price structural equation. The e¤ect of budget de…cit on land price increases a little. Results of new regression are available upon request. 16 Estimation results of land price structural equation and housing price structural equation are not reported here due to space limitation, but are available upon request. could function di¤erently from other large cities. As indicated by Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 , the new results without these 4 cities nearly replicate those in Table 5 . For example, budget de…cit contributes little to housing price. Amenities, disposable income and the user cost of housing capital are the main determinants of housing price.
This implies that the main …ndings of this paper are not driven by the existence of the 4 super cities. In contrast, the economic mechanism described in the model applies to the 35 major cities across China.
The second robustness check employs an alternative measure of population. In Tables 4 and 5 , there is no solid evidence that population growth leads to housing price increase. This is probably due to the imperfect measure of urban population. Since an accurate measure of urban population is not available, total population, the sum of agricultural population with hukou, non-agricultural population with hukou and ruralurban migrants without hukou, has been used in Tables 4 and 5 . The urban population consists of the latter two parts, but the size of migrants could be poorly measured. To check the potential e¤ect of measurement errors, an alternative measure of population, non-agricultural population, which is usually more accurately measured under the household registration system, is used here. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 deliver the same message as Table 5 , except that the e¤ect of non-agricultural population on housing price indeed gets more pronounced: the estimated elasticity ranges from 0:149 to 0:609.
Last, one-period time lag is allowed for developers to build housing after bidding land. Speci…cally, for a given land quantity L t 1 , developers maximize their pro…t at period t, i.e., p t H t L t 1 (l t + c t ) c 0t , where H t = F (L t 1 ). Under the assumption that developers could rationally expect housing price and construction cost for the next time period, the land demand (4) and housing supply (5) become
and
Together with land supply (7) and housing demand (3), one can derive the following land price structural equation
housing price structural equation
and housing price reduced-form equation
Notice that since there is one-period lag in both l of (16) and d of (15), d is now two-period lagged in (17) . Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 report the estimation results:
The budget de…cit has no signi…cant positive e¤ect on housing price if not negative, while other …ndings of Table 5 are still observed.
Conclusion
Through the analysis on the interrelated housing and land markets, this paper tests a popular hypothesis that local governments'budget de…cit has caused a surge in housing prices in China. The empirical results con…rm a positive e¤ect of budget de…cit on land prices but deny budget de…cit as a driving force of housing prices. Demand side factors, such as amenities, income, and in particular, the user cost of housing capital have been found to be the main determinants of housing prices. Meanwhile, rapid growth of housing prices is found to be the most important explanatory variable in land price appreciation. Given the fact that many local governments have heavily relied on land lease revenue to meet their budget de…cit, it is not surprising why frequent price regulations ordered by the central government aiming to curb housing price in ‡ation haven't achieved the goal. As pointed out by Xu (2011) , …scal decentralization has been regarded as an important institution for the spectacular performance of Chinese economy. However, the very same institution, may also have created side e¤ects.
There are two major limitations in this paper that could be improved in future research. First, our theoretical model assumes all the variables except housing and land prices to be exogenous. Although our empirical exercises have allowed for the potential endogeneity of income, population, government revenue and expenditure, a more appealing treatment calls for a theoretical work in a general equilibrium framework where all such variables are endogenously determined. Second, the conclusion of the paper is subject to the availability and quality of data, especially on key variables such as housing prices, land prices and budget de…cit. Deng, Gyourko and Wu (2012) have made an important start on constructing constant quality housing and land prices using micro-level data. Nevertheless, the framework derived in this paper is generally useful for future research once more and better data are available. (5), (6) (lagged) A for (5), (6) (lagged) L 0 for (5), (6) excluding 4 super cities non-agriculture population time-to-build
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